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Competition and Complementarity of International Financial Centres  
from A Historical Perspective1 
Ayumu Sugawara2 (Tohoku University) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
An article, on 19 December 2013 NIKKEI Asian Review newspaper, showed an aspect of 
the relationships between international financial centres, which is competition of them, 
or more precisely how the relationships of the centres is perceived by people3. Then, 
interestingly, just within half a year after the news telling they lost the competition in 
the foreign exchange business to Singapore, Japanese policy makers have gone to be a 
helter-skelter and suddenly said they would try to strengthen the Tokyo financial 
centre4. Japanese policy makers tend to show such a behavior sometimes and, as I will 
mention later, a similar thing happened in 1996. 
    This Japan's case could be an extreme one. But, of course, competition itself is very 
important not only for the financial world but also for the economic world as a whole. 
Therefore, the concept of competition among international financial centres is accepted 
as a natural view point. 
    On the other hand, another view point to economic things and also in basic micro 
economics, that is complementarity, have been paid less attention. Of course, experts on 
financial history have not overlooked it. They carefully have dealt with both competition 
and complemetarity between the centres. However the latter have attracted less 
attention so far. But, I think, in depth of the history of international financial centres, 
we can find an important role of complemenarity of them as a sound base for financial 
activities such as international banking operations.  
    Of course, competition is one of the most basic and important concepts in the 
                                                   
1 This is a revised version of a paper presented by the author in the World Economic 
History Congress (WEHC) 2015 Kyoto (4 August 2015 at Kyoto, Japan) in the session 
titled “Competition and Complementarity of International Financial Centres: 
International Banking and Historical Perspective”. This paper is a result of the 
research by the author supported by a grant-in-aid from Zengin Foundation for Studies 
on Economics and Finance. The author thanks the Zengin Foundation for the financial 
support. 
2 An Associate Professor at the Graduate School of Economics and Management, 
Tohoku University.  
3 "Sun sets on Japan's status as Asia's financial centre", Nikkei Asian Review, 19 Dec. 
2013. 
4 “Governor wants Tokyo to be a global financial hub”, Nikkei Asian Review, 30 May. 
2014. 
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history of economics, but complementarity is a much for it. For example, 
complemetarity can be said, in other words, the division of labour, and that is also one of 
the main idea in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations. Therefore, I would like to deal with 
complementarity with equal importance compared to competition among international 
financial centres at least. 
     
2. Definitions of International Financial Centre 
 
As the beginning of the details in a paper which is interested in the relationship 
between international financial centres, it is reasonable to begin with searching for the 
definition of international financial centre. In 1992, Geoffrey Jones said, in his very 
sophisticated paper about the history of financial centres in Asia-Pacific and the Middle 
East, “financial centres are much discussed but rarely defined.”5 However, Youssef 
Cassis’ definitions in his grand work on the topic can be a good starting point. He 
defined a financial centre in two ways; firstly, “a financial centre can thus be considered 
the grouping together, in a given urban space, of a certain number of financial services” 
and secondly, “or in a more functional way, it can be defined as the place where 
intermediaries coordinate financial transactions and arrange for payments to be 
settled.”6 
    However above mentioned definitions can be applied to all financial centres both 
domestic and international. Therefore, Cassis carefully continued to distinguish the 
levels of financial centre based on geographical scope; “this concentration (of financial 
industry) can be found at national, regional…and world levels, depending on the extent 
of the geographical area served by on financial centre."7 
    After focusing on international financial centres, there is a lot of approaches to 
group them into some types. Among them, we follow Jone’s typology. He divided 
international financial centres into three categories; sub-regional, regional, and global 
centres.8 We chose the typology firstly because it is clear and avoids unnecessary 
complexity and secondly because, though its simple appearance, it is thoroughgoing 
prepared to explain the rises and falls of international financial centres. 
 
                                                   
5 Jones (1992), p.405. 
6 Cassis (2010), p.2. 
7 Cassis (2010), p.2. 
8 Jones (1992), pp.405-406. There, it is said that a sub-regional financial centre focuses 
on serving to bilateral trades of the host country and other economies. However, rather 
we prefer the definition that a sub-regional international financial centre has 
relationship with a global financial centre bilaterally. 
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3. Peking Orders of International Financial Centres: A Current Example 
 
Grouping of international financial centre based on its geographical scope leads to put 
the centres on a pecking order. From such a view point, there is a lot of rankings of 
international financial centres about each period, not only current but also historical. 
Firstly, we take “the Global Financial Centre Index” as an example of current rankings 
of international financial centres in the table 1. However, the Index does not divide the 
centres like sub-regional, regional, and global. It just gives scores to each centres. 
    As a result of the scoring, the Index put the international financial centres in an 
order in the table 1. In the table 1, London and New York occupied 1st and 2nd places 
through the years. More interestingly, Hong Kong and Singapore, two Asian centres, 
established their 3rd and 4th places in the global financial world. Among Asian centres, 
Tokyo has fallen behind Hong Kong and Singapore though until the 1990s it was said 
that Tokyo was one of the three global financial centres with London and New York.9 
    As Jones and Cassis mentioned financial centres provide a wide variety of financial 
services,10 therefore researchers are interested in the volumes of each type of trade in 
order to put centres in an order based on an quantitative criteria. Because I cannot deal 
with the data of the wide variety of services, I pick up an example of international 
financial services, foreign exchange turnover in the figure 1 and 2. The figure 1 shows 
foreign exchange turnovers of five largest trading countries, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong, in the service. Although the former 
three countries are not just the centers in them, London, New York, and Tokyo, we deal 
with country names as proxies of each centre due to the data’s limitation.  
    In the figure 1, here also London and New York are the largest centres being worthy 
of their name as a global financial centre. And recent further concentration on the UK 
(London) is also eye catching. On the other hand, in the figure 1, three Asian economies 
looks very small, although they are third, fourth, and fifth largest foreign exchange 
trading places in the world. Switzerland follows them as the sixth largest trading 
country and she has 3.2 per cent share. 
    Due to the difficult looking of three Asian economies in the figure 1, we put just 
three Asian economies’ shares in the figure 2. The figure 2 shows that Japan, Singapore, 
and Hong Kong are equally matching in the field. However, when we make our 
perspective pretty wider, it is impressive that Japan has declined in the field since 1989, 
when the BIS provided the first survey on the global foreign exchange turnover. At that 
                                                   
9 Jao (1997), p.101. 
10 Jones (1992), p.405; Cassis (2010), p.2. 
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time, Japan dealt with US$ 111 billion foreign exchanges per day compared to the UK’s 
184 billion, the US’s 115 billion, Switzerland’s 56 billion Singapore’s 55 billion, and 
Hong Kong’s 49 billion. In the figure of 1989, Japan was catching up with the United 
States and having the double size turn over to Singapore and Hong Kong. Thus, the 
distribution of foreign exchange business in Asia has changed dramatically.11 
 
4. Peking Orders of International Financial Centres: A Historical Example 
 
In the academics on financial history, Howard Reed(1981) compiled long term rankings 
of international financial centres. He decided the rankings based on quantitative data. 
Under the limitation of data availability for 80 years, He forged the term, international 
"banking" centre, because the available data are just included the number of the 
headquarters of domestic banks in a centre, the number of "direct links" of domestic 
banks12, and the number of the offices of foreign banks in the centre.13 The results of 
Reed’s research on the international “banking” centres is shown in the table 2. Like the 
table 1 on current rankings, in the table 2, London and New York had dominated their 
1st and 2nd status. Through the years, Paris, Hong Kong, German centres (Berlin, 
Hamburg, or Frankfurt), and Japan’s centres (Yokohama and Tokyo) had appeared in 
the 3rd through 5th status.  
In the table 2, for example, the ranks of New York and Paris in 1900 probably 
attract skeptical views most. It takes place because on 1900 Reed could just used two 
types data, the number of private (merchant and investment) banks in a centre and the 
number of correspondences of domestic banks in the centre.14 Especially, the type of 
private banks which Reed chose led a serious bias, because his selection excluded Paris 
“haute” banks. The same thing might happen about Berlin in 1900 because famous 
Germany private banks like Bleichroeder.15 
    With the extended data availability, Reed compiled the ranking of international 
“financial” centres from 1955 to 198016 and the result is shown in the table 3. In order 
to make the rankings in the table 3, Reed used foreign assets and liabilities of a centre’s 
domestic banks or center’s host economies in the case of like Hong Kong or Singapore, 
                                                   
11 "Sun sets on Japan's status as Asia's financial centre", Nikkei Asian Review, 19 Dec. 
2013. 
12 Reed (1981), p.10. However, the definition of "direct links" is unclear. It seems the 
number of correspondents. 
13 Reed (1981), pp.17-25. 
14 Reed (1981), p.17. 
15 On Paris, see Cassis (2010), pp.57-58. On Germany, Cassis (2010), p.59. 
16 Reed (1981), pp.25-31. 
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the number of branches and agencies of domestic banks in a centre, and the number of 
branches of foreign banks in the centre17, in addition to the data of the table 2. On the 
years from 1955 to 1980, the results in the tables 2 and 3 are basically similar, 
particularly the positions of London, New York, Paris and Tokyo. One prominent 
character of the table 3 is the presence of San Francisco in 1955 and 1965. It probably 
comes from the global presence of the Bank of America headquartered at the city at that 
time. 
    In sum of these historical development, at least after the First World War, there 
have been two global financial centres, London and New York, in the world, and Asia 
has not had such type of centres. Instead, Asia has had three regional financial centres, 
Hong Kong, Tokyo, and Singapore after the Second World War, and before the War, 
Shanghai was added to them.18 However, setting positions of Paris and Berlin before  
World War II, and of Tokyo in the 1980s is still difficult because sometimes they looked 
playing global roles respectively. In Europe, at least Zurich has been a prominent 
regional financial centre.19 
 
5. Competition of Centres: A Focus in the Development of Researches 
 
With the historical development of relationships between international financial centres, 
researches on it had also developed. Charles Kindleberger is regarded as the founder of 
the modern research on the topic, although his book in 1974 mainly focused on the 
historical formations of national financial centres. His main interests were whether 
single or plural financial centres each country had, why so, and how the centers were 
formed. Then in 1981, Howard Reed, as we have already seen, had done the first 
organized research on rankings of international financial centres in the long term.  
    After the beginning by Kindleberger, literature in the field has tended to focus on 
competition between international financial centres. One reason is that Kindleberger 
emphasized a pressure to concentrate financial transactions in a single centre in a 
country and suggested to apply the idea about a country to the global economy. He said 
"the same concentration that produces a single dominant financial center within a 
country (with the possible exception of Canada) tends to result in the emergence of a 
single worldwide center with the highly specialized functions of lending abroad and 
                                                   
17 Reed (1981), p.10. However, it is unclear the difference between an office of a foreign 
bank and a branch or an agency of the bank. 
18 Jones (1992), p.407, Table 21.1. 
19 Cassis (2010), passim. He also emphasizes the role of Geneva. 
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serving as a clearinghouse for payments among countries."20 It can be taken as a 
message that become a single centre, or fade away in the global finance by following 
researchers and policy makers. In other word, some can regard the relationship of 
international financial centre as a zero-sum game. 
    Such pessimists could have their theoretical foundation. It was provided by a Nobel 
laureate Paul Krugman in his Geography and Trade in 1993. In the book, he presented 
"a model of geographic concentration" in order to explain the logic of making a single 
manufacturing centre in a country. In the two-places model, while economic resources 
distributed equally, each place has manufacturing capacity respectively, when the 
balance of resources between the places is lost, the place with more resources becomes 
the single manufacturing ‘centre’.21 
    Japan presented an example of such a competition-oriented and pessimistic view. 
In 1996, Kazuo Ueda sounded an alarm bell of fear of disappearance of an international 
financial centre. He modified two-paces model of Krugman in order to apply to the 
financial industry and use the modified model as the base of his argument.22 In a real 
political world in Japan, Ueda and his colleague's pessimistic view could pave a road to 
Hashimoto government's Japanese version of financial "big bang" deregulation policy in 
1996. Behind the case of Japan, had been the competition between Asia's three 
international financial centre, Tokyo, Singapore, and Hong Kong and latter two's faster 
growth. 
 
6. Complementarity of Centres: Another Focus of the Researches 
 
Although there has been the focus on competition of the centres in the development of 
researches and it has brought the fear of disappearance of a centre, in historical reality 
no disappearance of an established international financial centre has not taken place 
expect for fading away due to a war, a civil war, and a communist revolution. Reed and 
Jones clarified some spectacular falls of international financial cenres respectably. The 
table 2 based on Reed tells the fall of Berlin concurrently with the defeat of Germany in 
World War II and the partition of the city by four victorious nations.23 In the article 
dealing with Asia-Pacific and the Middle East, Jones gave clear-cut explanations to the 
rises and falls of Shanghai and Beirut. Shanghai was forced out of the status as a 
                                                   
20 Kindleberger (1974), p.247. 
21 Krugman (1993), pp.14-33. 
22 Ueda (1996), pp.218-228. 
23 See also Cassis (2010), pp.215-217. 
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regional financial centre by the Communist Revolution in China in 1949.24 Beirut 
flourished as a regional financial centre during the late 1949s to the 1960s attracting 
foreign banking operations from Europe and America even including the pro-type of 
Euro-currency business. However, the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975 
ended the role of Beirut as a regional financial centre.25 Thus it were severe political 
events that have destroyed international financial centres. On the other hand, just 
economic competition between centres have not led an international financial centre 
disappeared. 
    In the long history, a lot of international financial centres has been co-existed 
rather than has tried to ruin each other even though they have competed between 
themselves. Therefore, it is reasonable to shift our focus on the other side of the 
relationship between international financial centres; the complementarity of them.  
Actually, some leading scholars have already embarked on paying more attention to the 
complementarity; for example, Chaterine Schenk and Youssef Cassis, both in the 
2000s.26 
    Yet, long ago, as a forerunner, in 1931 Paul Einzig sometimes emphasized the 
complementarity of centers in his book although whose title was the Fight for Financial 
Supremacy and actually his main interests were in challenges of New York and Paris to 
London respectively after World War I. For example he said, "in the past, the two 
Anglo-Saxon countries have found it easy to create a common basis for financial 
co-operation..."27 Further, "there is indeed wide scope for co-operation between the 
three countries; none of them is at present strong enough to support any really large 
international loan transaction without the assistance of the others" and "another field 
in which co-operation should produce useful results is that of acceptance credits."28 
Thus, in both long term capital and short term money markets, it is worthwhile 
searching for mechanisms of complementarity of international financial centres. 
    More recently, Schenk pointed out the very significant idea about the 
complementarity of London and New York markets in the 1960s; “the financial 
activities of Frankfurt and Paris were dwarfed, however, by the enhanced integration of 
New York and London.”29 As mediators connecting the two centres, she attaches the 
importance of the roles of American banks; “the regulatory environment…generated the 
                                                   
24 Jones (1992), p.410. 
25 Jones (1992), pp.408-409, 412. 
26 Recently, an IMF working paper also emphasizes the complementarity between 
current Hong Kong and Singapore financial centres. Le Lesle et al (2014). 
27 Einzig (1931), p.129. 
28 Einzig (1931), pp.131-132. 
29 Schenk (2002), p.97. 
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multinational expansion of US banks and the intensification of their activities in 
European financial centres, in particular London.”30 Although still there is a room to be 
filled like the meaning of “the integration of New York and London”, the idea is an 
excellent jumping-off point for further researches about complementarity of 
international financial centres. 
    Finally, Cassis’ grand work about the history of international financial centres also 
have seriously and usefully dealt with the complementarity of centres. On the 
international financial centres particularly about capital markets before World War I, 
he said, “cooperation among financial centres, or rather among the banking houses 
operating in different centres, thus seemed to be the dominant characteristics…”31 
Here also, like Schenk, the role of banking operation is emphasized. Further, in detail of 
capital markets, he added “on the level of primary market, one of the clearest indicators 
of this integration was the simultaneous floating of an issue in several financial centres” 
and “on the level of the secondary market, the financial centres grew closer through 
international arbitrage operations.”32 
 
7. Points for Empirical Researches on the Complementarity of the Centres 
 
With these developments of the history of the international financial centres and 
researches on it, we can set our points for empirical researches on the relationship 
between the centres. There are three point. Firstly, we pay special attention to banking 
operations as mediators between the centres. As mentioned partly in the previous 
section, both Schenk and Cassis emphasized the roles of banks to connect financial 
centres, and even Einzig did the same about relationship between London and New 
York in the 1920s.33 Among banking operations, we deal with both money and capital 
markets because financial centres contain wide variety of financial services as 
literature mentioned. 
    Secondly, on long term capital markets, we pay attention to the roles of merchant 
and investment banks and also borrowers. In such a view point, simultaneous issues in 
multiple international financial centres are particularly important as Einzig and Cassis 
have already mentioned.34 
                                                   
30 Schenk (2002), p.97. 
31 Cassis (2010), p.133. 
32 Cassis (2010), pp.131-132. 
33 Einzig (1931), p.73. "The same cordial relationship that developed between the 
monetary authorities have also existed between banks in London and New York." 
34 The case of Japanese government bond issues, see Suzuki (2015). 
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    Finally, on short term money and foreign exchange market, we focus on the 
operations of commercial banks and exchange banks. Money and foreign exchange 
markets provide places for accommodating banks’ liquidity, especially not only for 
putting their reserves in a wider sense and for putting their working capital, but also for 
borrowing funds temporarily.35 On the other hand, banks choose the places for their 
accommodation of liquid assets and for borrowing short term funds.36 
    We present an example about the roles of money and foreign exchange markets, 
because the roles of such short term markets have been mentioned less than the roles of 
capital markets in literature about the relationship between the international financial 
centres. A case of a Japanese exchange bank, Yokohama Specie Bank in 1930, is picked 
up.37 The situation of the balance sheets of Yokohama Specie Bank in the year broken 
down by branches was clarified by a group of Japanese researchers. Here, we just deal 
with the geographical distribution of the Yokohama Bank’s liquid assets at that time. 
On bankers balances, 44 per cent was put in the Tokyo branch, 31 per cent in the New 
York agency, and 14 per cent in the London branch respectively. Bonds were allocated in 
the Yokohama headquarter with 93 per cent of them and in the New York agency with 6 
per cent. Therefore, for the Yokohama Bank, in 1930 New York was more important 
than London at least from the view point of the quantity of liquid assets. Being different 
from these two items, gold and silver were mainly concentrated in China; the Shanghai 
branch held 38 per cent of them and the Dalian branch had 9 per cent. Yet the 
Yokohama headquarter also held 36 per cent of their assets in the form of precious 
metals. In China, the precious metals particularly silver were the most liquid means for 
settlement at that time. In order to scrutinize the centers such as London, New York 
and Shanghai in the 1930s from the international banking view point, we can 
compare Yokohama Specie Bank to the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China 
about their liquid asset distributions in the centres, for example.38 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
35 On the concepts of bank's reserve and bank's running capital, see Hicks (1989), Chap. 
8, pp.66-67. 
36 Keynes (1923), pp.103-109. Keynes (1923) said "the difference between the spot and 
forward rates is...the measure of the preference of the money and exchange market for 
holding funds in one international centre rather than in another...". (p.103.) 
37 Yamazaki (1988), pp.92-97. The balance sheets in Jan. 1930 are in pp.94-95. 
38 On the Chartered Bank's Shanghai branch relationship with the London 
headquarter and the New York agency, see Siu (2015). 
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Table 1 
Ranking of International Financial Centres: 
A Current Example
Y2011 Y2012 Y2013 Y2014
London London New York New York
New York New York London London
Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong
Singapore Singapore Singapore Singapore
Zurich Zurich Zurich San Francisco
Seoul Tokyo Tokyo Tokyo
4
Source: The Global Financial Centres Index, 14-16, 2011-2014
 
 
Figure 1 
Sizes of A Financial Service: Foreign 
Exchange Turn Over (% of Global Trade)
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Figure 2 
Size of A Financial Service: Foreign 
Exchange Turn Over (% of Global Trade)
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Table 2 
Ranking of International Financial Centres: A Historical 
Example
Y1900 Y1915 Y1930 Y1940 Y1947 Y1960 Y1975 Y1980
London New York London London London London London London
New York London New York New York New York New York New York New York
Paris HongKong Paris Paris Paris Tokyo Paris
HongKong Paris Yokohama Tokyo Paris Frankfurt
Berlin Berlin HongKong Tokyo
HongKong Hamburg Hamburg
Amsterdam San Francisco HongKong
Montreal Zurich
Tokyo San Francisco
7
International ‘Banking’ Centres by Reed, The Preeminence of 
International Financial Centers, 1981
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Table 3 
Ranking of International Financial Centres: 
A Historical Example
Y1955 Y1965 Y1975 Y1980
New York London London London
London New York New York New York
Paris Paris Tokyo Paris
HongKong Tokyo Paris Tokyo
San Francisco San Francisco Frankfurt Frankfurt
Osaka HongKong Zurich
Tokyo Frankfurt Amsterdam
8
International ‘Financial’ Centres by Reed, The Preeminence of 
International  Financial Centers, 1981
 
